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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, former 
employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), for allegedly 
conspiring with a government official to obtain and transmit national defense 
information in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.1 The Department of Justice 
alleged that Rosen and Weissman had conspired with a third defendant, Lawrence 
Franklin, to obtain national defense information Franklin had acquired as a Pentagon 
analyst, and to communicate that information to journalists and foreign officials.2 
The conduct on which the AIPAC prosecution was based—the receipt and 
transmission of classified information in violation of the Espionage Act—led to 
renewed concerns among journalists about the reach of this statute and similar laws 
to their own newsgathering conduct. Although the United States ultimately 
abandoned the AIPAC prosecution, claiming several rulings in the case had made it 
difficult for the government to meet its burden, the concerns for journalists raised by 
the prosecution remain.3 In the AIPAC prosecution, the government sought to hold 
private citizens criminally liable for the kind of conduct journalists engage in every 
day—receiving and transmitting information from persons who themselves may have 
violated the law in providing it.
 This article examines the limitations, if any, placed by the First Amendment on 
the permissible reach of criminal statutes as applied to journalists, either directly or 
through principles of secondary liability, in the wake of the publication of information 
allegedly received from a person who may have accessed or provided such information 
in violation of a criminal statute. Part II provides an overview of the general First 
Amendment principles that must inform any analysis of the reach of criminal statutes 
to the media’s newsgathering conduct. Part III examines the interplay between the 
First Amendment and various theories of criminal liability as applied to the press’s 
unauthorized receipt and publication of information ordinarily protected against 
public disclosure. Part IV summarizes the authors’ conclusions about the constraints 
imposed by the First Amendment on the prosecution of journalists for engaging in 
such conduct.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Va. 2009). Rosen and Weissman were 
indicted under two subsections of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (g), which criminalize the 
communication of national defense information to persons not authorized to receive it. Rosen, 599 F. 
Supp. 2d at 693.
2. Franklin pled guilty to several charges as part of a plea bargain and received a twelve-year prison 
sentence, which was later reduced to ten months’ house arrest. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 693; Jerry 
Markon, Sentence Reduced in Pentagon Case, Wash. Post, June 12, 2009, at A12.
3. Indeed, a Federal Bureau of Investigation linguist recently pled guilty to providing classified information 
to a blogger and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, suggesting that unauthorized disclosures of 
information to the press will continue to raise questions about the press’s alleged role in criminal 
conduct. See Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, Politico (May 25, 2010, 4:44 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37721.html.
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ii. gOVErning first aMEndMEnt prinCipLEs
 A. Truthful Speech About Newsworthy Matters
 Contemporary interpretation of the First Amendment proceeds from the premise 
that “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution 
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of 
public concern without . . . fear of subsequent punishment.”4 Thus, in a variety of 
contexts, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “truthful information about a 
matter of public significance” receives extremely broad constitutional protection from 
the reach of criminal and civil statutes.5 The Court has in fact explained that, even 
when “a matter of public significance” is not involved, “state action to punish the 
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”6 In 
short, there is an “overarching ‘public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the 
dissemination of truth.’”7
 In the context of publications addressing newsworthy matters of public concern, 
moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the protection of truthful speech is at its 
zenith.8 Under such circumstances, “[t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or 
criminal sanctions.”9 Indeed, the “general proposition that freedom of expression 
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment”10 is so firmly entrenched 
in the First Amendment that it forms the foundation for the Supreme Court’s 
elaborate jurisprudence holding that even false and defamatory speech about 
newsworthy matters must be afforded broad protection from criminal and civil 
liability in order to provide sufficient “breathing space” for the dissemination of 
truthful information about such matters.11 As the Court explained most recently in 
Bartnicki v. Vopper,12 “[t]hose cases all relied on our ‘profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,’” and “require[] the conclusion” that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not 
4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101– 02 (1940).
5. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533–34 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 
103 (1979)). 
6. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102– 03; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (holding that, even in commercial speech context, “the First Amendment 
presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all”). 
7. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).
8. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (stating that accurate information about newsworthy 
matters “occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to 
special protection” (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))). 
9. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 
778 (1986) (“[S]peech of public concern is at the core of the First Amendment’s protections.” (citing 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985))). 
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
11. Id. at 279 n.19; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
12. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the 
highest order.”13
 B. Newsworthy Matters of “Public Concern”
 As the Supreme Court observed in Time, Inc. v. Hill, “[t]he guarantees for speech 
and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, 
essential as those are to healthy government.”14 Rather, the Court has explained that 
“[f]reedom of discussion, if it [is to] fulfill its historic function in this nation, must 
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the 
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”15 Thus, in a variety 
of contexts, courts have determined that “a publication is newsworthy if some 
reasonable members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it.”16 
These holdings are synthesized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not limited to 
“news,” in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends also to 
the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for 
purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may 
reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.17
And matters cease to be newsworthy only “when the community has no interest in 
them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a 
stranger,”18 or when the interest in the matter constitutes “a morbid and sensational 
prying into private lives for its own sake.”19
 In this manner, both the First Amendment and the common law distinguish the 
unprotected publication of putatively private information “for its own sake,” on the 
one hand, from the protected publication of the same information when it relates to 
matters of broader public concern, on the other.20 Thus, for example, in Florida Star v. 
13. Id. at 528, 534 –35 (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g 
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
15. Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (noting that judicial analysis of 
whether a publication addresses a newsworthy subject “incorporates considerable deference to reporters 
and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press to 
report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest”). 
16. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485. 
17. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. j (1977).
18. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
19. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Hill, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (1967) (“[I]t has been agreed that there is a generous privilege to serve 
the public interest in news” in the face of claims “against the press for public disclosure of truthful but 
private details about the individual which caused emotional upset to him.” (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., 
Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 326, 355–56 (1966)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) 
1019
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
B.J.F., where a newspaper acquired and published the name of a rape victim in 
violation of state law, the Supreme Court held that, though unquestionably private, 
the plaintiff ’s identity constituted “information about a matter of public significance,” 
especially “[a]t a time in which we are daily reminded of the tragic reality of rape.”21 
Similarly, in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., the California Supreme Court 
concluded that a television broadcast depicting an accident victim’s “appearance and 
words during [a] rescue and evacuation” were “of legitimate public interest,” both 
because “[a]utomobile accidents are by their nature of interest to that great portion of 
the public that travels frequently by automobile” and because the “rescue and medical 
treatment of accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of the public, 
involving as it does a critical service that any member of the public may someday 
need.”22
 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the protection afforded 
by the First Amendment to newsworthy matters of public concern may not vary 
based on the identity of the publisher of such information, the perceived “value” of 
the information reported, or whether the publisher profited from its dissemination. 
First, as the Court famously explained in Lovell v. City of Griffin:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It 
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaf lets . . . . The press in its historic 
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.23
Thus, for example, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court extended First 
Amendment protection to an advertising parody published in Hustler magazine, 
which depicted the Reverend Jerry Falwell engaged in an “incestuous rendezvous 
with his mother in an outhouse.”24 The Court so held despite its recognition that the 
parody “published in Hustler [was] at best a distant cousin” of the editorial cartoons 
that for centuries have played a significant role in public discourse, reasoning that “a 
central tenet of the First Amendment [is] that the government must remain neutral 
in the marketplace of ideas.”25
(holding that the newsworthiness concept “properly restricts liability for public disclosure of private 
facts to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise 
effective editorial judgment”).
21. 491 U.S. 524, 536–37 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).
22. 955 P.2d 469, 487–88 (Cal. 1998).
23. 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); see also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) 
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs 
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within 
the First Amendment guarantee.”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press . . . 
includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaf lets and circulars.”).
24. 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
25. Id. at 55–56 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“Though we can see nothing of any 
possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as 
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 Second, the Supreme Court has expressly disavowed any test of whether particular 
“speech” falls within the protections of the First Amendment that is premised on ad 
hoc determinations of its “value” in comparison with the “harm” it is alleged to have 
perpetrated.26 Instead, the Court has constructed a handful of narrow, precisely 
defined categories of expression that are not protected by the First Amendment at 
all, including obscenity, defamation, and “fighting words,”27 and has rejected the 
notion that constitutional analysis of otherwise protected expression should depend on 
judicial assessment of its comparative worth.28 As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
[T]he first amendment is as close to an absolute as we have in our jurisprudence: 
Speech shielded by the amendment’s protective wing must remain inviolate 
regardless of its inherent worth. The distaste we may feel as individuals 
toward the content or message of protected expression cannot, of course, 
detain us from discharging our duty as guardians of the Constitution.29
 Finally, the Court has consistently held that whether a publication is sold for 
profit is of no relevance for First Amendment purposes.30 Accordingly, the Ninth 
the best of literature.”); Shulman, 955 P.2d at 482 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
expression apply with equal force to [a] publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment 
feature . . . .” (omission in original) (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of 
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social 
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself ref lects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”); id. at 1586 (rejecting notion that a 
test may be applied “to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed 
valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor”).
27. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has in 
recent years “narrowed the scope” of even these “traditional categorical exceptions”); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1583–84 (declining to hold that depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, constitute unprotected 
speech).
28. See, e.g., Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (“The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient 
reason for suppressing it.” (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Am. 
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331–32 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that the Supreme 
Court “sometimes balances the value of speech against the cost of its restriction, but it does this by 
category of speech and not by the content of particular works”), aff ’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“refused to embrace the notion that the degree of first amendment protection ‘depend[s] on the Court’s 
judgment as to the value of the protected speech that might be deterred’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761–62 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))).
29. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 541; see also Dible v. Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
degree of protection the first amendment affords speech does not vary with the social value ascribed to 
that speech by the courts.” (quoting Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit motive 
could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases 
from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”); City of Lakewood 
v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988) (“[T]he degree of First Amendment protection 
is not diminished merely because the newspaper or speech is sold rather than given away.”); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“Speech . . . is 
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Circuit has explained that “[a] profit motive . . . does not diminish a journalist’s First 
Amendment rights” and “does not render its newsgathering and reporting 
activities . . . [as] entitled to less than full First Amendment protection.”31
 C. Governmental Interest of the “Highest Order”
 As the Supreme Court noted in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the protections afforded by 
the First Amendment to accurate speech about newsworthy matters may properly 
give way only in the face of a statutory scheme that is narrowly tailored to vindicate 
a governmental interest of the “highest order.”32 In this regard, the Court has 
explained that the First Amendment’s protections may properly be divested “only in 
exceptional cases”33 because imposition of “a penal sanction for publishing lawfully 
obtained, truthful information . . . requires the highest form of state interest to 
sustain its validity.”34 To date, the Court has defined such “exceptional cases” narrowly 
to include the following circumstances: “[W]hen the country is at war, when a 
sovereign seeks to protect the primary requirements of decency by prohibiting 
obscenity, and when the security of community life is threatened by incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of an orderly government.”35
 On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed a perceived “collision 
between claims of privacy and those of the free press,”36 and, in each such instance, it 
has applied the First Amendment to protect truthful speech about newsworthy 
matters. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, for example, the father of a rape-murder 
victim brought an invasion of privacy action against a broadcasting company for 
disclosing in a news report his daughter’s identity in violation of a Georgia statute.37 
The Court held that the First Amendment prohibited such a claim in the face of the 
“public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth,”38 because 
the broadcast involved a newsworthy matter of public concern, as opposed to 
revelation of “purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs.”39 In so holding, 
protected [by the First Amendment] even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit . . . .”); 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are 
published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
31. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1985).
32. 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
33. Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Westhafer¸  739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 469 U.S. 
1200 (1985).
34. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 101–02. 
35. Worrell Newspapers, 739 F.2d at 1223.
36. E.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
37. Id. at 492. 
38. Id. at 491 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
39. Id. (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8).
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the Court noted “a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy,”40 
but concluded that, despite these “impressive credentials,”41 the government interest 
in preserving personal privacy must yield to the “First and Fourteenth Amendments 
and . . . the public interest in a vigorous press.”42
 Similarly, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court confronted the criminal 
prosecution of a newspaper, which, following a shooting at a junior high school, 
obtained and published the name of the alleged juvenile assailant in violation of a 
West Virginia statute.43 At the outset of its analysis, the Court noted that “[o]ur recent 
decisions demonstrate that state action to punish the publication of truthful information 
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”44 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
state’s interest in protecting the privacy of youthful offenders—an interest that was 
not only of immediate reputational nature but that also related to the ability of the 
child to rejoin society after the imposition of any sanction by the juvenile court—was 
not of sufficient magnitude when confronted by the First Amendment.45
 In Florida Star, the statute at issue made it “unlawful to ‘print, publish, or 
broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication’ the name of the victim of a 
sexual offense.”46 In holding that it could not be applied to a newspaper reporter who 
learned the name of a rape victim and thereafter published it in the newspaper’s 
“Police Reports” section, the Court explained that, although the governmental 
interests said to be served by the statute—i.e., the protection of the privacy of victims, 
the protection of the physical safety of victims, and the encouragement of victims to 
report such crimes—were “highly significant,” they were nevertheless insufficient to 
trump the First Amendment.47
 Most recently, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that two radio stations and a 
radio talk show host could not be held liable under the federal and Pennsylvania 
wiretap statutes for receiving from a third party, and thereafter disclosing to their 
listeners, a tape recording of a private telephone conversation between the two 
plaintiffs that had been surreptitiously recorded in violation of those statutes.48 The 
Court noted that the case “present[s] a conf lict between interests of the highest 
order—on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information 
concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy” 
fortified by the right of the plaintiffs, grounded in the First Amendment as well, to 
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. at 489.
42. Id. at 495.
43. 433 U.S. 97, 98–101 (1979).
44. Id. at 102. 
45. Id. at 104.
46. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (omission in original) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 794.03 (1987)).
47. See id. at 537, 541.
48. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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engage in “private speech.”49 Nevertheless, even though the “stated purpose[]” of the 
wiretap statutes was “to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral 
communications,”50 and even though “[p]rivacy of communication[s] is an important 
interest,”51 especially given the fact that “the fear of public disclosure of private 
conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech,”52 the Court held 
that the statutes could not be applied in these circumstances because “[they] impose[] 
sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern.”53 Specifically, 
the Court held as follows:
In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in 
publishing matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in 
their classic law review article: “The right of privacy does not prohibit any 
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.” One of the costs 
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.54
49. Id. at 518. Because the wiretap statutes served to vindicate the First Amendment-based right to engage 
in “private speech,” the Court distinguished its decisions in Cox Broadcasting, Daily Mail, and Florida 
Star on the ground that, while those cases involved assertions of an important—but non-constitutional—
interest in protecting personal privacy, in Bartnicki there were “important interests to be considered on 
both sides of the constitutional calculus.” Id. at 533. As Justice Breyer explained in his concurring opinion 
in Bartnicki, in cases in which there are constitutional rights “on both sides of the equation, the key 
question becomes one of proper fit,” id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and the Court must determine “whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing consequences,” id. In the typical case, however, in which the privacy 
interest is not grounded in the First Amendment itself, there is a dispositive lack of equivalence between 
the First Amendment right to disseminate truthful speech, on the one hand, and the governmental 
interest in protecting personal privacy, on the other—i.e., only the former is protected by the written 
Constitution.
50. Id. at 523 (quoting Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b), 
82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 532.
52. Id. at 533.
53. Id. at 534.
54. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 193, 214 (1890)); see also id. (“Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant 
of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society 
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.” (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 
374, 388 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The common law privacy tort, the creation of 
which was championed by Warren and Brandeis in response to their concern that the late nineteenth-
century “press was overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private information and that 
there should be a remedy for [such] abuses,” Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975), has 
from the outset been cabined by the recognition that “[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any 
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.” Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 214. This is 
despite the fact that, as early as 1890, “[g]ossip . . . ha[d] become a trade, which [was] pursued with 
industry as well as effrontery” to “satisfy a prurient taste.” Id. at 196; see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 411–12 (1960) (“[T]he press has a privilege, guaranteed by the Constitution, to 
inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest,” which “arises out 
of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the 
press and other agencies of information to tell them.”); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 
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 D. “Unlawfully Acquired” Information
 In all of its cases addressing the First Amendment’s protection of truthful 
information about newsworthy matters, the Court has recognized that such 
protections necessarily apply when the information has been “lawfully obtain[ed]” by 
its publisher.55 In Bartnicki, the Court specifically considered whether, “[w]here the 
punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a 
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the 
government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect 
in a chain?”56 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that “a 
stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield 
from speech about a matter of public concern.”57 This is so, the Court explained, 
even when the press obtains the information with actual knowledge of the source’s 
unlawful conduct.58
 This conclusion followed from the Court’s previous decisions, most notably 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia59 and Florida Star. In Landmark 
Communications, unidentified persons—including one described by the resulting 
article as “a lawyer subpoenaed to appear at the hearing”60—provided information in 
violation of a criminal statute to a newspaper regarding a confidential proceeding 
before Virginia’s Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.61 The Court held that 
the statute could not constitutionally be applied to the newspaper.62 Although the 
Court was silent on this point, it appears that whoever initially disclosed confidential 
information in Landmark did so in violation of a statutory duty imposed on him as a 
participant in the Commission’s proceedings. Similarly, in Florida Star, the police 
official who provided the rape victim’s name to the newspaper did so in violation of 
an analogous duty.63 Nevertheless, in both cases, as in Bartnicki itself, the Court held 
478 (Cal. 1998) (holding that “newsworthiness” is a “complete bar to common law liability” under the 
“publication of private facts” tort); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (stating that to 
impose liability for publication of private facts, plaintiff must prove that the published material “is not 
of legitimate concern to the public”). 
55. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528. 
56. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner I ), 191 F.3d 463, 
484–85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 532 U.S. 
1050 (2001).
57. Id. at 535. 
58. See id. at 517–18 (emphasizing that, although the defendants “did not participate in the interception, . . . 
they did know—or at least had reason to know—that the interception was unlawful”).
59. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
60. Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities & Organizations in Support of Respondents at 11, Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728).
61. Landmark Commc’ns, 435 U.S. at 837.
62. See id. at 838.
63. Name, Address, Etc., of Sex-Crime Victim Exempt From Pub. Records Law, Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 075-
203 (July 14, 1975), available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/8C3790DB6191D6
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that such unlawful conduct by a newspaper’s source does not vitiate the protection 
afforded to the newspaper by the First Amendment.
 Following Bartnicki, the lower courts have explored the extent to which a 
publisher’s interaction with a source who unlawfully acquires information can be said 
to implicate the publisher itself in illegal conduct that might provide a constitutional 
basis for civil or criminal liability. In Boehner v. McDermott, for example, which the 
Supreme Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration in light of 
Bartnicki, the court of appeals addressed the liability of a Congressman who met 
personally with a married couple that had illegally recorded a wireless telephone 
conversation, acquired a recording of the conversation from them, promised them 
both anonymity and immunity from prosecution in return, and then disseminated 
the recording to two newspaper reporters.64 Although the court was sharply divided 
on the issue, a majority rejected the contention that “[o]ne who obtains information 
in an illegal transaction, with full knowledge the transaction is illegal, has not 
‘lawfully obtain[ed]’ that information.”65 Rather, the court’s majority concluded that 
“the otherwise-lawful receipt of unlawfully obtained information remains in itself 
lawful, even where the receiver knows or has reason to know that the source has 
obtained the information unlawfully.”66 As the majority explained:
The Supreme Court has decided the first issue of this case, that is, whether 
the United States . . . can constitutionally bar the publication of information 
originally obtained by unlawful interception but otherwise lawfully received 
by the communicator, in the negative. We venture to say that an opposite rule 
would be fraught with danger. Just as Representative McDermott knew that 
the information had been unlawfully intercepted, so did the newspapers to 
whom he passed the information. . . . We do not believe the First Amendment 
permits this interdiction of public information either at the stage of the 
newspaper-reading public, of the newspaper-publishing communicators, or at 
the stage of Representative McDermott’s disclosure to the news media.67
93852566B70066A4C5 (“A police chief who is the custodian of any such records containing such 
identifying information is obligated and charged with the duty by operation of law not to allow or 
permit public inspection or examination of such records.”).
64. (Boehner II ),  484 F.3d 573, 575–76 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
65. Id. at 585 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott 
(Boehner III ), 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). A majority 
of the court joined in Part I of Judge Sentelle’s dissent, which discusses the Bartnicki holding as applied 
to the facts in Boehner. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 585 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 586. A different majority of the same court upheld the entry of summary judgment against 
Representative McDermott because he, unlike the newspapers that subsequently received the same 
information from him, had violated a legal duty imposed on him as a member of the House Ethics 
Committee to maintain the confidentiality of information provided to him in that capacity. See id. at 
581 (“When Representative McDermott became a member of the Ethics Committee, he voluntarily 
accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of the . . . illegal recording. He 
therefore had no First Amendment right to disclose the tape to the media.”). 
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 Similarly, in Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, the First Circuit, applying Bartnicki 
and citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Boehner, held that the First Amendment 
protected the Internet posting of an audio and video recording of an arrest and 
warrantless search of a private residence, even though the person who posted it had 
reason to know at the time she received the recording that it had been made illegally.68 
The court rejected the contention that “the essential distinction between this case 
and Bartnicki was that [i]n Bartnicki, the interceptor had already disseminated the 
tape before [the defendant] passively received it and disseminated it further,” while in 
Jean, “it was Jean’s active collaboration” with the interceptor “that made his unlawful 
dissemination possible in the first instance.”69 Relying on Boehner II, the court 
reasoned that, “if McDermott had been a private citizen, like Jean, the court would 
have concluded that his disclosure of the tape was subject to First Amendment 
protection regardless of the fact that he received the tape directly” from the interceptor 
with knowledge that it had been obtained unlawfully.70
 These decisions reflect the reality that the press routinely seeks out information 
from a variety of sources, many of whom may be held to have violated a statute, a 
private contract, or some other legal or ethical duty either in obtaining the information 
or by disclosing it to the press. The courts have nevertheless concluded that, when 
the press induces sources to disclose what they know about newsworthy matters, it is 
protected by the First Amendment when it proceeds to publish such information, 
regardless of the legality of its source’s actions.71
iii. CriMinaL LiabiLity and thE first aMEndMEnt
 A. Applicable Principles of Statutory Construction
 To satisfy due process, a criminal statute must define the prohibited conduct 
“with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited” and “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
68. 492 F.3d 24, 30 –33 (1st Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 31 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 32.
71. See, e.g., Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1526 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a claim that 
the press unlawfully received a confidential police report through a conspiracy with unnamed police 
sources on the grounds that a reporter who copies information contained in such a report “would not be 
a receiver of . . . stolen goods”), aff ’d, 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991); Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 
223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the First Amendment precludes tort claims against 
the press for “soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading agents, employees and members of the 
State Bar to engage in the unauthorized and unlawful disclosure of information” because “the news 
gathering component of the freedom of the press—the right to seek out information—is privileged at 
least to the extent it involves ‘routine . . . reporting techniques’” such as “asking persons questions, 
including those with confidential or restricted information” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 
656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (finding no tort liability where a newspaper secured confidential student 
transcripts from a source because “the information, though perhaps emanating ultimately from 
confidential University records, was not obtained by any personal act of invasion or intrusion” by the 
newspaper). 
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enforcement.”72 A criminal statute that fails to satisfy these conditions will be deemed 
“void-for-vagueness.”73 But if it can, a court will construe a statute narrowly to avoid 
such a result.74
 The Court applied these principles of statutory construction most recently in 
Skilling v. United States, a decision arising from the criminal prosecution of long-time 
Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling.75 In Skilling, the Court considered whether 18 
U.S.C. § 1346, known as the “honest services fraud” provision of the federal mail 
and wire fraud statutes,76 was impermissibly vague and therefore violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.77 The Court construed the statute to reach 
only bribes and kickbacks, thereby limiting its reach to avoid offending the Fifth 
Amendment.78
 Section 1346 establishes that a “scheme or artifice to defraud” for purposes of the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes “includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another 
of the intangible right of honest services.”79 The legislative history of § 1346 reveals 
that the predominant purpose of the statute was to “reverse” the Supreme Court’s 
decision in McNally v. United States, in which the Court held that the mail fraud 
statute was designed to protect money and property rights, not the alleged right of 
the citizenry to “good government.”80 Thus, in enacting § 1346, Congress sought 
nothing more than to enable the wire and mail fraud statutes to be used as vehicles 
for prosecution of public corruption.81
 Given its broad language, however, judicial construction of § 1346 before Skilling 
understandably focused on “‘the need to find limiting principles’ to cabin” its scope 
because, “[w]ithout some kind of limiting principle, honest services wire fraud could 
potentially make relatively innocuous conduct subject to criminal sanctions.”82 Thus, 
72. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–28 (2010); see also Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2963, 2968 (2010) (reiterating the essential holding of Skilling). 
73. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
74. See id. (noting prior case law “which requires us, if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress’ 
enactments”). 
75. See id. at 2907, 2927–28. 
76. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2006); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927.
77. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927–28.
78. Id. at 2931.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
80. 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); see, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. 23,953 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“This bill 
will make it possible, once again, to prosecute and send to prison those public officials who corrupt their 
offices and betray the trust placed in them.”); 134 Cong. Rec. 33,296–97 (1988) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers) (“[A]s a result of the McNally decision many significant prosecutions of political corruption 
brought under the mail and wire fraud statutes have been dismissed or overturned on appeal. . . . This 
amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision.”).
81. See supra note 80.
82. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 795 
(2009); see also United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that without 
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although some courts concluded that the statute may reach the conduct of private, 
non-governmental defendants in at least some circumstances,83 others extended such 
liability to private persons only where there was a fiduciary relationship between the 
victim and the defendant.84 Still others did so only where the defendant intended or 
reasonably could have foreseen that the scheme would cause economic or property 
harm.85 In any case, under certain circumstances journalists obtaining information 
from persons who violated a law (or their employer’s policies) in accessing or disclosing 
the information arguably were vulnerable to prosecution under the statute.86 For its 
part, the Court noted in Skilling that “there was considerable disarray” among the 
courts of appeals concerning the proper scope of the statute’s application.87 Still, the 
Court declined to invalidate the statute, choosing instead to construe it, consistent 
with its legislative history, to reach only bribery and kickback schemes.88 In doing so, 
the Court explained: “It has long been our practice, . . . before striking a federal 
statute as impermissibly vague, to consider whether the prescription is amenable to a 
limiting construction.”89
 This principle of narrow construction should apply with equal force where the 
prosecution in question arises from the newsgathering conduct of a journalist or 
news organization. As the Court has put it, criminal statutes that potentially inhibit 
the exercise of First Amendment rights “must be scrutinized with particular care.”90 
Most significantly, such statutes must be construed narrowly to avoid conflicts with 
the First Amendment.91 Narrow construction has been deemed to be particularly 
appropriate limiting principles, honest services fraud amendment could criminalize “every breach of 
contract or every misstatement made in the course of dealing”). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 569–70 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing examples of cases 
in which § 1346 was applied to private actors).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 718, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2006).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
86. For example, if a health worker accessed and disclosed to a journalist private information about a patient 
in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and used any form of 
electronic communication in doing so, the journalist arguably could have been subject to prosecution for 
aiding and abetting a violation of the wire fraud statute. In this instance, under a broad reading of 
§ 1346, the worker has deprived his employer of the intangible right of his honest services.
87. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010).
88. Id. at 2931.
89. Id. at 2929.
90. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 
(1987)); see also Reed Enters. v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[P]rosecutions involving 
possible collision with First Amendment rights are not subject to the routine consideration given 
prosecutions under ordinary criminal statutes.”). 
91. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 112, 121 (1948) (construing the term “expenditure” in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), to exclude publication-related expenses because, if the statute “were 
construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting 
their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to 
their interests from the adoption of measures or the election to office of men, espousing such measures, 
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appropriate when the legislative history of a generally applicable statutory scheme 
evinces no intention to criminalize the activities of the press and others engaged in 
the process of collecting and disseminating information to the public.92
 Let us suppose, for example, that the federal government sought to prosecute a 
journalist for receiving and publishing non-public health information about a member 
of Congress under a theory that the journalists aided and abetted a violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a), the provision of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) authorizing criminal sanctions for the acquisition and 
disclosure of protected health information.
 Neither the face of HIPAA nor its legislative history reveals any suggestion that 
Congress considered or otherwise sought to impose criminal sanctions on the process 
by which the press reports to the public about newsworthy matters. Thus, for 
example, the criminal penalties for the unlawful use, acquisition, and disclosure of 
health information pursuant to HIPAA apply, on their face, only to the conduct of 
“covered entities,” which include health plans and health care providers, but contain 
no reference to the press or to others who disseminate health-related information 
about newsworthy subjects to the public.93 HIPAA’s legislative history confirms both 
that its stated purpose was to promote “the efficiency and effectiveness of the health 
care system, by encouraging the development of a health information system through 
the establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of 
certain health information,”94 and that it is devoid of references to any perceived 
problem—warranting congressional intervention or otherwise—relating to the 
disclosure to or subsequent dissemination of health-related information by the press.95 
the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality”); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 
844, 852 (2d Cir. 1974) (“It is difficult to imagine a setting where a narrow interpretation would be 
more appropriate than when a criminal statute might otherwise impinge on First Amendment 
rights.”).
92. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (“Particularly in the light of the absence of any 
detailed findings by Congress,” it is difficult to conclude that a statute that impacts the First Amendment 
is “narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.”).
93. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-6(a)–(b), 1320-9(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2009); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010) 
(providing the definition of “covered entity”).
94. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-191, § 261, 110 Stat. 
1936, 2021.
95. In addition, it appears that none of the prosecutions that have been pursued under HIPAA to date 
contemplate that the statute is designed to reach the press, either directly or through theories of 
secondary liability such as “aiding and abetting” and “conspiracy.” See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y for 
So. Dist. of Fla., Palmetto General Hospital Employee and Accomplice Indicted for Stealing Patient 
Records As Part of Fraud Scheme (May 26, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/f ls/PressReleases/ 
090526-01.html (describing the indictment of a hospital employee and her accomplice—who allegedly 
stole patient information to use in an identity and credit-card theft scheme—for, among other things, a 
conspiracy to violate HIPAA); United States v. Hollern, 366 F. App’x 609 (6th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of an indictment for disclosing personal health information in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6 when the defendant chiropractor videotaped patients under false pretenses and sold tapes for 
commercial gain); Ian C. Smith Dewaal, Successfully Prosecuting Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act Medical Privacy Violations Against Noncovered Entities, U.S. Att’ys’ Bull., July 2007, 
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Construing HIPAA to authorize the prosecution of the press, under a theory of 
aiding and abetting, necessarily would implicate the First Amendment, and, in view 
of HIPAA’s legislative history, a court could fairly conclude that the statute never 
was intended to reach the conduct of the press in gathering information from persons 
who themselves may have violated the statute.96
 B. Criminal Liability and the Press
 The First Amendment’s restrictions on the application of criminal liability 
theories to members of the press who seek out, receive, and publish information 
about newsworthy matters are not simply theoretical. Rather, they have informed the 
relationship between the press and the criminal justice system every time a controversy 
has arisen in the lower federal courts over the publication of information leaked to 
journalists by someone under a legal obligation not to disclose it. As we discuss 
below, many of the most important stories in the history of journalism were based on 
information provided by sources in violation of a criminal statute.97 In every such 
case, moreover, a literal reading of the relevant statutes would support an argument 
that the journalist illegally received information or conspired with a source to obtain 
or disclose information for an unauthorized purpose.98 Nevertheless, it appears that 
no journalist has ever been prosecuted under such theories. Rather, journalists have 
only been prosecuted in the rare circumstance where they directly committed an 
unlawful physical act, such as removing a piece of debris from the wreckage of a 
sabotaged aircraft,99 “stealing documents,” or engaging in “private wiretapping.”100
at 10, 14–15 (discussing United States v. Williams, No. 1:06-CR00129-UNA (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2006), in 
which defendant, a hospital employee, conspired to steal identities of four hundred health care 
clearinghouse patients and was convicted of, among other things, conspiracy to obtain protected health 
information with the intent to sell it for personal gain; Indictment, United States v. Ramirez, No. M-05-
708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 5922818, in which defendant sold protected health information 
to undercover FBI agents and pleaded guilty to violating HIPAA; and Acceptance of Plea Guilty, 
United States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004), 2004 WL 2188280, in 
which defendant charged with violating 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3) and (b)(3) by disclosing patient’s 
name, date of birth, and social security number to obtain credit cards in patient’s name); Esther Seitz, 
Privacy (or Piracy) or Medical Records: HIPAA and Its Enforcement, 102 J. Nat’l Med. Ass’n 745, 747 
(2010), available at http://www.nmanet.org/images/uploads/Publications/MLS745.pdf (discussing a 
case in which defendant, a licensed nurse, pleaded guilty to disclosing individually identifiable 
information about a patient to her husband, who then threatened to use it against the patient in an 
upcoming legal proceeding).
96. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929–30 (2010) (“We have . . . instructed ‘the federal 
courts . . . to avoid constitutional difficulties by [adopting a limiting interpretation] if such a construction 
is fairly possible.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 
(1988))).
97. See infra Part III.C.
98. See infra Part III.C.
99. See United States v. Sanders, 17 F. Supp. 2d 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff ’d, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000).
100. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (“Although stealing documents or private wiretapping 
could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such 
confuct, whatever the impact on the f low of news.”). Indeed, we are aware of only one attempt to bring 
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 Several cases in both the criminal and civil context have in fact considered what 
might happen if a prosecution of the press beyond such circumstances were ever 
attempted. All have concluded that the First Amendment would likely pose obvious 
and potentially insurmountable barriers to the use of both direct and secondary 
liability theories to criminalize the pursuit of information by journalists. In United 
States v. Morison, for example, a government employee was convicted under both the 
Espionage Act and 18 U.S.C. § 641 of providing classified photographs of Soviet 
naval installations to Jane’s Defense Weekly (“Jane’s”), a publication that reported on 
security-related matters.101 The government charged that the employee, Samuel 
Morison, had been effectively compensated by Jane’s for his actions.102 He was a paid 
consultant to Jane’s at the time, there was evidence that Jane’s had affirmatively 
solicited the transmission of documents from him, and the government alleged that 
he hoped to improve his chances of permanent employment at Jane’s by providing the 
photographs.103 Not only was Jane’s never charged, but the prosecution of Morison 
itself proved controversial in large part due to concern that, in a future case, the 
government might be tempted to pursue journalists involved in other exchanges of 
information.104
 As a result, in affirming Morison’s conviction, two members of the Fourth 
Circuit’s three-judge panel wrote separately to emphasize their doubt that the First 
Amendment would countenance such a prosecution. Judge Wilkinson explained that 
“Morison as a source would raise newsgathering rights on behalf of press organizations 
that are not being, and probably could not be, prosecuted under the espionage statute” 
and stated that “it is important to emphasize what is not before us today. This 
prosecution was not an attempt to apply the espionage statute to the press for either 
the receipt or publication of classified materials.”105 Judge Phillips likewise expressed 
his concern that the court’s affirmance of Morison’s conviction not be construed to 
“threaten[] the vital newsgathering functions of the press.”106
 A number of federal courts have similarly considered First Amendment-based 
overbreadth challenges by defendants to the application of § 641 to the oral 
transmission of government information. In so doing, several have sua sponte cautioned 
that obtaining and disclosing information to the press—which was not at issue in 
a prosecution against a journalist that is even remotely based on the theories discussed herein. In 1973, 
Les Whitten, “the chief investigative reporter for syndicated columnist Jack Anderson,” was charged as 
a principal with receiving stolen government documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). See 
Mark Feldstein, The Jailing of a Journalist: Prosecuting the Press for Receiving Stolen Documents, 10 Comm. 
L. & Pol’y 137 (2005) (offering detailed account of Whitten’s prosecution). However, the charges were 
subsequently dropped when the grand jury declined to issue an indictment. Id. at 161.
101. 844 F.2d 1057, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 1076.
103. See id. at 1060– 61, 1076 –77. 
104. See id. at 1084.
105. Id. at 1081, 1085 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring).
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any of those cases—would raise substantial constitutional questions. Thus, in United 
States v. Jeter, the Sixth Circuit held that, in the “limited circumstances” of that 
case—which involved leaking grand jury information to the targets of an 
investigation—no serious First Amendment barrier existed to affirming the 
conviction.107 Nevertheless, the court noted that “[w]e do not attempt to determine 
the constitutionality of Section 641 in a ‘Pentagon Papers’ kind of situation.”108
 Courts have raised analogous concerns in the civil context. In Zerilli v. Evening 
News Ass’n, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered a Bivens claim arising after 
newspaper reporter unlawfully conspired with federal officials to procure confidential 
transcripts of illegal wiretaps.109 The Court rejected the theory because, among other 
reasons, “finding the newspaper liable in the present case would amount to holding a 
newspaper liable in damages for uncovering and publishing information that it deems 
newsworthy. The values served by a free and vigilant press militate against such a 
result.”110 For this reason, the press has been held potentially liable for conspiring 
with federal officials to violate private rights only where some non-speech-related 
conduct causing tangible injury to person or property, such as a physical trespass, was 
at issue.111
 Indeed, the long history of clashes between the government, private parties, and 
journalists over subpoenas for their confidential sources reinforces the principle that 
a criminal prosecution of reporters whose sources leak information to them would be 
beyond the constitutional pale. Such subpoenas have usually arisen in the context of 
cases in which confidential sources are alleged to have unlawfully provided 
information to a journalist.112 Laws proscribing the disclosure of information, such as 
the Privacy Act of 1974113 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),114 are the 
most common sources of such disputes.115 In almost every such case, the facts describe 
107. 775 F.2d 670, 682 (6th Cir. 1985).
108. Id.; see also United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that application of § 641 to 
intangible investigative information was not overbroad as applied to the defendant, even though “the 
statute might conceivably trespass upon the first amendment rights of others”). The reference to “Pentagon 
Papers” is to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which the Supreme Court 
rebuffed the government’s efforts to secure a prior restraint prohibiting the publication of documents that 
“were purloined from the Government’s possession” and that the newspaper defendants solicited and 
received “with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired.” Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
109. 628 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 224.
111. See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that attempting to apply broader theories of liability for 
misappropriation of intangible information “would certainly raise important First Amendment 
problems”).
112. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
114. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (limiting the disclosure of a matter before a grand jury).
115. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 
37 (1st Cir. 2004); Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 
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a “conspiracy” pursuant to which a journalist provided something that may have been 
of substantial value to a source (such as a promise of confidentiality or publicity 
which the source may have believed served his or her personal interests) in exchange 
for which the source provided information that it was legally prohibited from 
disclosing.116 Not only have the reporters in these cases never been criminally charged, 
but most courts have recognized that some form of qualified privilege protecting the 
source’s identity from compelled disclosure applies in these circumstances,117 and the 
legislatures in more than a dozen states have provided for an absolute privilege where 
analogous disputes arise under state criminal laws.118
 The role of the First Amendment in this context is perhaps best illustrated by 
United States v. Rosen,119 also known as the AIPAC prosecution.120 Prior to Rosen, the 
government had never used the Espionage Act to charge a civilian who was not 
himself alleged to be a spy,121 and had also never applied the provisions of the Act at 
438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See, e.g., Lee, 413 F.3d 53; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 
(4th Cir. 2000); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 963 F.2d 567 
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
118. Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2010 Regular and First Spec. Sess.); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (West, Westlaw through the First Spec. Sess., and 
legislation effective Jan. 11, 2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510 (LEXIS through the 2010 Fiscal 
Sess.); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West, Westlaw through c. 733 (end) of the 2010 portion of the 2009–
2010 Regular Sess., the end of the 2009–2010 First through Eighth Extraordinary Sessions, and all 
propositions on 2010 ballots); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320 –26 (LEXIS through 77 Del. Laws, 
Ch. 476); D.C. Code §§ 16-4701 to -4 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 22, 2010); Ind. Code Ann. 
§§ 34-46-4-1 to -2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Public Laws approved and effective through the 2010 
Second Regular Sess.); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (LEXIS through the 2010 First Extraordinary 
Sess.); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-112 (LEXIS through all chapters of the 2010 Regular 
Sess. with updates for sections effective through Jan. 1, 2011); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 26-1-901 to -03 
(LEXIS through 2010 Regular and Spec. Sess.); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to -47 (West, Westlaw 
through the 101st Legislature Second Regular Sess. 2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.275 (LEXIS through 
the 26th (2010) Spec. Sess.); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (LEXIS through 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.8 (LEXIS through the 214th Legislature First Annual Sess.); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West, Westlaw through 2010 File 58 of the 128th General Assembly 
(2009–2010), approved by 2/2/11 and filed with the Secretary of State by 2/2/11); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 44.510–40 (West, Westlaw through the laws enacted during the 2010 Spec. Sess. of the 75th Oregon 
Legis. Assembly); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5942 (West, Westlaw through Act 92 of the 2010 Regular 
Sess. of the Pennsylvania General Assembly); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.68.010 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2010 2nd Spec. Sess. and Laws 2011, Chapters 1 and 2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 885.14 (West, 
Westlaw through 2009 Wisconsin Act 406 (End)). In addition, Utah’s Supreme Court, under authority 
granted by the state’s constitution, adopted Utah R. Evid. 509 in 2008, granting near absolute 
protection for confidential sources. Utah R. Evid. 509; see Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4.
119. 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006).
121. See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 628–29.
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issue in Rosen to the receipt and disclosure of purely oral information.122 As applied 
in those circumstances, the district court in Rosen rejected the government’s argument 
that no First Amendment issue was raised by the novel indictment.123 Rather, it 
resolved the defendants’ constitutional arguments by holding that the statute could 
only survive First Amendment scrutiny as applied to the specific facts alleged if 
construed narrowly to require the government to prove a heightened intent 
requirement—i.e., that the defendants acted with a bad-faith purpose to undermine 
national security.124
 C. Potential for Chilling Speech About Newsworthy Matters
 Taken as a whole, these disparate strands of law appear to reveal a consistent 
theme. Courts have both explicitly and implicitly recognized that any attempt to 
seek criminal (or civil) sanctions against the press for providing what might be 
deemed to be incentives to sources so that they will provide information about 
newsworthy matters would face substantial First Amendment hurdles.125
 A different constitutional rule—one that would permit the imposition of criminal 
liability on the press when it can broadly be said to have “induced” or “conspired” 
with a source to secure newsworthy information for publication—would fundamentally 
alter public discourse. If, for example, the press could be prosecuted for “aiding and 
abetting” violations of the Privacy Act, it would appear that the Washington Post, Bob 
Woodward, and Carl Bernstein could all have been charged in the wake of their 
persistent solicitation and receipt of information from FBI Deputy Director Mark 
Felt about the FBI’s then-ongoing investigation of specific, identified persons 
implicated in the Watergate investigation who had not yet been indicted.126 Similarly, 
it would appear that the San Francisco Chronicle could have been charged with aiding 
and abetting a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) when a criminal 
defense lawyer agreed to provide the Chronicle with details of grand jury testimony 
given by some of the most prominent athletes in professional sports as part of a 
Pulitzer-Prize winning series of articles about the extent to which performance-
enhancing drugs had infiltrated both professional and amateur athletics.127 And 
122. See id. at 614.
123. Id. at 629–30 (“[T]he conduct at issue—collecting information about United States’ foreign policy and 
discussing that information with government officials . . . , journalists, and other participants in the 
foreign policy establishment—is at the core of the First Amendment’s guarantees.”).
124. See id. at 625–27; see also United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 209 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2007).
125. Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531 (2001) (“Although this case demonstrates that there may be 
an occasional situation in which an anonymous scanner will risk criminal prosecution by passing on 
information without any expectation of financial reward or public praise, surely this is the exceptional 
case.”).
126. See John D. O’Connor, I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat, Vanity Fair, July 2005, at 86.
127. See, e.g., Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Giambi Admitted Taking Steroids, S.F. Chron., Dec. 2, 
2004, at A1; Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, What Bonds Told BALCO Grand Jury, S.F. 
Chron., Dec. 3, 2004, at A1.
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criminal liability could apparently have been imposed on the Wall Street Journal for 
its solicitation and receipt of internal Enron documents from confidential sources 
within the company that detailed Enron’s illegal accounting practices; those 
documents led to a groundbreaking series of articles, but were provided by disgruntled 
employees, arguably in breach of their fiduciary obligations to the company.128
 By the same token, it would appear that analogous theories of liability for 
violations of HIPAA would have provided the basis for criminal prosecution of the 
Orange County Register as a result of its Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on the 
unethical practices of the previously acclaimed fertility clinic at the University of 
California-Irvine.129 That reporting was based on the contents of putatively 
confidential medical records obtained by the newspaper from a source within the 
clinic—records which documented how eggs retrieved from one patient were 
implanted in another, without the knowledge or consent of the donor.130 Under the 
same theories, one could envision prosecution of a newspaper that reported, based on 
confidential medical records received from a hospital employee, that the Vice 
President had developed a serious heart condition, that several hospital patients who 
had recently traveled abroad had contracted a highly contagious disease and brought 
it to the United States, or that the serious illness of several hospital patients had been 
traced to tainted meat circulating in the national food supply.
iV. COnCLUsiOn: first aMEndMEnt LiMitatiOns
 The preceding discussion illuminates the First Amendment-based principles that 
likely would govern judicial determination of the constitutionality of a prosecution of 
128. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Trading Places: Fancy Finances Were Key to Enron’s Success, 
and Now to Its Distress, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 2001, at A1. For other examples of award-winning 
journalism made possible by the “inducement” of sources to provide newsworthy information to the 
press in breach of fiduciary duties owed to their employers or otherwise unlawfully, see Seymour M. 
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib; American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far Up Does the Responsibility Go?, 
New Yorker, May 10, 2004, at 42 (news report of abuse of Iraqi prisoners based on confidential 
documents and photographs provided to reporter by unnamed source within U.S. military); Walter 
Pincus, Carter Is Weighing Radiation Warhead, Wash. Post, June 7, 1977, at A5 (news report of 
government’s plans to produce “neutron bomb” based on classified information received by journalist 
from government informant); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing 
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1 (news report disclosing CIA practice of sending suspected terrorists to secret prisons in 
foreign countries based on classified documents leaked to reporter by government sources); James Risen 
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (news 
reports discussing classified program of domestic wiretapping based on information provided to 
reporters by government sources).
129. See Susan Kellerher & Kim Christensen, Baby Born After Doctor Took Eggs Without Consent, Orange 
County Reg., May 19, 1995, at A1.
130. See id. The newspaper eventually discovered and reported that at least sixty women were victims of such 
theft by the clinic. See Susan Kellerher, Kim Christensen, David Parrish & Michelle Nicolosi, Clinic 
Scandal Widens, Orange County Reg., Nov. 4, 1995, at A16. The facts that the newspaper reported 
resulted in the criminal prosecution of the physicians involved, “prompted the American Medical 
Association to rewrite its fertility-industry guidelines,” and instigated legislative action. See Kim 
Christensen, Fertility Bills Seen as Effective Steps, Orange County Reg., Aug. 30, 1996, at A26.
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the press in the wake of its acquisition and publication of information received from 
a person who accessed or provided such information in violation of a criminal statute. 
These principles suggest that, at a minimum, the solicitation, receipt, and publication 
of information by the press can constitutionally be deemed to violate such statutes 
only if their scope is cabined, by legislative amendment or judicial decision, in 
material ways. Otherwise, the reach of such statutes would appear to be extraordinarily 
broad, reaching any effort by a reporter to secure information from a source that, for 
example, its employer (including the government) would prefer remain secret. 
Accordingly, it appears that, at a minimum, the application of such statutes to the 
press, whether directly or through laws imposing secondary liability, can survive 
First Amendment scrutiny only if construed to require that (1) the press conduct at 
issue be unrelated to communicative acts involving the transmission of information, 
or (2) the defendant evince some bad-faith purpose other than and beyond the intent 
to obtain information for the purpose of reporting it to the public.
 Absent such limitations, it appears there is a substantial argument that any 
prosecution of the press for violating such a criminal statute, for aiding and abetting 
a violation of such a statute, or for conspiring with a source to violate such a statute—
based on the contention that the press had “induced” or “conspired” with a third 
party to engage in unlawful activity—would violate the First Amendment. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions, a broad range of press conduct 
that involves “soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading” sources “to engage in 
the unauthorized and unlawful disclosure of information”131 is protected by the 
Constitution. A statutory scheme that purports to criminalize such activity, without 
both specifying and cabining its reach, would be unlikely to survive a constitutional 
challenge, whether it is analyzed under the First Amendment-based requirement 
that even a statute that has an incidental impact on protected speech must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”;132 under the First 
Amendment-based “overbreadth” doctrine;133 or under the Fifth Amendment, which 
“prohibits punishment pursuant to a statute so vague that ‘men of common intelligence 
131. Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Ct. App. 1986).
132. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 216 (1997) (“‘[T]he essence of narrow tailoring’ is ‘focussing [sic] on the evils the 
[Government] seeks to eliminate . . . [without] significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech 
that does not create the same evils.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))); Boehner II, 484 F.3d 573, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sentelle, 
J., dissenting) (stating that where federal wiretap statute on its face yielded a result that “no one in the 
United States could communicate on [a] topic of public interest,” it could not be constitutionally applied 
to the acquisition and dissemination of newsworthy information); Boehner I, 191 F.3d 463, 485 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“Not only is this not narrow tailoring, this is not tailoring of any 
sort.”), vacated, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001).
133. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (“Given a case or controversy, 
a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it 
substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.”).
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must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’”134 Thus, the 
government would face a daunting task in crafting a statute that would survive 
constitutional scrutiny.
134. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 617 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 
U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
